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 CORPORATE DIPLOMACY AND FAMILY FIRM LONGEVITY  
Luciano Ciravegna, Liena Kano, Francesco Rattalino, Alain Verbeke 
ABSTRACT 
We discuss family firm longevity building upon a new conceptual lens, informed by transaction 
cost economics (TCE), but augmented with corporate diplomacy thinking. Family firms, because 
of their superior foundation of bonding social capital (interpreted here as a firm-specific, 
transaction cost reducing governance mechanism), have an intrinsic advantage vis-a-vis non-
family firms with regards to utilizing network ties supportive of longevity. Most family firms, 
however, fail to leverage effectively this governance tool to achieve longevity, due to bifurcation 
bias (BB), i.e., the unchecked prioritization of assets and relationships that hold affective value 
for the family. We propose that corporate diplomacy, through its three process steps, 
familiarization, acceptance, and engagement, can help the family firm augment its baseline 
reservoir of social capital, and allows improved economizing on contracting challenges that 
endanger its survival. Externally, corporate diplomacy helps economizing on expressions of BB 
in relationships with outside stakeholders, thus augmenting bridging social capital. Internally, it 
can address biased treatment of family versus non-family human assets, thereby augmenting 
bonding social capital. Inter-generationally, corporate diplomacy supports access to, and 
improved reliance upon the firm’s social capital by next generation family members. The family 
firms that focus on corporate diplomacy processes and the resulting social capital creation, 
greatly improve their chances of longevity.  
 
 
Key words: family firm, family firm longevity, family firm longevity paradox, transaction cost 
economics, bifurcation bias, corporate diplomacy  
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INTRODUCTION 
Few family firms, or firms where more than one generation of family is involved in ownership, 
leadership and/or decision-making (Bennedsen & Foss, 2015), survive for more than three 
generations  (Stamm & Lubinski, 2011). Yet, most of the world’s oldest surviving organization 
(excluding educational institutions, governments, and religious institutions), such as Gekkeikan, a 
Japanese firm brewing sake since the 1600s, are in fact family firms (Bennedsen & Henry, 2016; 
World Atlas, 2018). This variance in family firms’ lifespan presents a family firm longevity 
paradox, which we attempt to explain in this study.  
Prior transaction cost economics (TCE) work on family firms explains the first part of the 
paradox, that is, the low survival rates of family business. Bifurcation bias (BB), or de facto 
preferential treatment of assets that have affective value for the firm (Jennings, Dempsey, & 
James, 2018; Kano & Verbeke, 2018; Verbeke & Kano, 2012), creates additional bounded 
rationality challenges (related to scarcity of mind) and bounded reliability ones (related to 
scarcity of making good on open-ended promises), and can threaten firm survival. Family firm 
research based on other theoretical foundations, such as stewardship theory and the socio-
emotional wealth (SEW) perspective, focuses on the second part of the paradox – the reasons 
why family firms may be better placed at surviving in the long term than non-family firms. Such 
better odds are ascribed to family firms’ long-term orientation (LTO), or a particular way of 
viewing time and making intertemporal choices (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). LTO is 
argued to stem from family firms’ prioritization of transgenerational continuity (Memili, 
Chrisman, & Chua, 2011; Miller & Le Breton Miller, 2005, 2006; Jaskewicz, Combs, & Rau, 
2015), as well as from family members’ willingness to ‘steward’ the firm in the long run due to 
the alignment of interests between owners and managers (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Many family firms share the features that the literature has 
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identified as supportive of LTO, such as the desire for transgenerational wealth transmission.  
However, the pursuit of transgenerational continuity can, in itself, threaten business survival, if 
prioritized indiscriminately, without selecting economizing governance practices supportive of 
the long-term health of the business (Kano & Verbeke, 2018).1  
Most TCE work on family firms focuses on firm-level governance, but TCE argues that 
firm survival depends upon the ability to economize on both micro-level contracting challenges 
in the realm of bounded rationality and reliability, and equivalent challenges from macro-level 
shift parameters (changes in the broader political, institutional, social and economic contexts).  
Williamsonian (1996) macro-level shift parameters can vitiate governance tools that firms adopt 
to economize on bounded rationality and reliability, for example, when government agencies 
introduce abrupt changes in the legal framework relied upon when signing contracts with third 
parties.  Only firms with the ability to adapt to these macro-level changes can achieve longevity.  
It has been argued that some family firms command a unique governance mechanism, 
namely superior social capital, and are able to sustain this tool in the long term and transmit it 
trans-generationally. These firms are thereby supposedly apt at the sort of stakeholder 
management that helps economizing on macro-level shifts (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; 
Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). Yet, few family firms successfully utilize this governance 
mechanism facilitating long-term survival, because of dysfunctional BB, which prevents them 
from effectively developing and deploying their social capital outside of the context of affective 
family-based ties. Achieving longevity implies augmenting the social capital stemming from the 
family with new relationships to support efficient transactions, and ensuring that these 
relationships are routinely assessed on the basis of their efficiency properties.  
                                                 
1 Governance practices refer in our paper to established routines through which managerial choices are made and 
implemented, in the realm of selecting the firm’s boundaries, structuring the interactions with external stakeholders 
and engaging in internal organizational design (including fine-grained practices at the functional level). 
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We explore how family firms can address these challenges by taking on board insight 
from the international relations literature, more specifically research on corporate diplomacy. 
Corporate diplomacy can be described as a set of processes whereby corporations achieve 
recognition as value-creating partners in broader society. They do this through aligning their 
corporate values with societal value systems, thereby augmenting their social capital. Corporate 
diplomacy thinking suggests actionable paths in the process sphere to strengthen social capital as 
a governance mechanism, allowing inter alia, the favourable repositioning of the firm in its 
broader environment (Ordeix-Rigo & Duarte, 2009).  In the context of family firms, which from 
the outset supposedly command superior social capital, built around family ties, the nurturing of 
corporate diplomacy processes is instrumental to achieving longevity. Corporate diplomacy helps 
family firms economize on BB, at the micro and macro levels, and transmit economizing 
practices across generations of family managers.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  We start by summarizing extant 
research on family firm longevity and provide a brief review of core TCE arguments in the 
context of family firms.  Next, we review the concept corporate diplomacy. We then develop our 
conceptual model and explain how family firms use corporate diplomacy processes to adapt to 
their macro environment, achieve firm-level governance efficiency, and transmit successful 
practices through generations. We conclude with summarizing our findings and discussing 
implications for future research. While this is a deductive, theory-driven study, our ultimate goal 
is to attain an in-depth understanding of drivers of longevity in real-world family firms. We rely 
on examples of old, multi-generational family firms to support our conceptual arguments.   
FAMILY FIRM LONGEVITY  
The family firm literature suggests that the pursuit of non-economic goals, such as a desire for 
dynastic succession, emotional attachment of the family to the business, and identification with it, 
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creates incentives for long-term survival (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & 
Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Further, the desire to transmit wealth to future generations implies that 
family firms often extend the time horizon of expected returns and are willing to invest in long-
term projects, a phenomenon labelled ‘patient capital’ (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Scholars espousing the stewardship perspective argue that family members are more 
likely to be ‘stewards’ of the firm, investing their personal relational and financial capital for the 
survival and success of the business, and avoiding short-term return-driven behavior that might 
compromise long-term survival (Davis et al., 1997; Le-Breton Miller & Miller, 2011). The 
stewardship perspective assumes that family members act in pursuit of organizational interests, 
and that this alignment of individual and organizational goals explains the ability to survive over 
the long term (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004).  However, family members may act in pursuit of self-
interest in ways that do damage to the firm, for example, by shirking or even pillaging its 
resource base (Schultze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001). Stewardship behavior does not 
automatically eliminate ‘basic truths’ about the nature of individuals, such as bounded rationality 
and reliability (Chrisman, 2018): that is, even when family managers purposefully act as 
stewards, their inherent bounded rationality and reliability may prevent them from achieving 
intended pro-organizational outcomes, unless there are control mechanisms in place to economize 
on information asymmetries and commitment non-fulfilments. Yet, evidence suggests that family 
managers are often reluctant to implement formal monitoring and control systems (Dyer, 2006). 
Stewardship behaviour may actually discourage formal controls (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; 
Hernandez, 2012). Stewardship, on its own, can therefore not explain longevity, nor can it 
explain why many family firms do not survive past the second generation.  
Lumpkin and Birgham (2011, p. 1050) define LTO as: “the tendency to prioritize the 
long-range implications and impact of decisions and actions that come to fruition after an 
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extended time period.”  They argue that families where decision makers are guided by LTO 
should be more apt at surviving in the long-term. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2011, p. 1171) 
argue that the key to understand longevity is multi-temporality, or “the ability to achieve 
enduring success by meeting both short and long-term challenges.” Here, the emphasis is not 
only on the importance of pursuing long-term objectives, but also on doing so in ways that do not 
compromise short-term performance, that is, balancing a long-term horizon with the ability to 
respond to market requirements in the short run. As suggested by Sharma & Manikutty (2005, p. 
295): “For firms desirous of longevity as family firms … changes in the environment require 
strategic responses on the part of a firm (such as readjustment of the business portfolio and 
divestment of unproductive resources), so as to enable regeneration and renewal”.   
Yet, family firms are known to be resistant to the types of changes mentioned by Sharma 
& Manikutty (2005); it has been argued that these firms are often less innovative, enter fewer 
new markets, and are less involved in patenting (Betrand & Shoar, 2006; Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & 
Larraza-Kintana, 2010).  Neither stewardship theory, nor work on LTO can therefore explain 
why some family firms achieve high longevity, whereas many more do not.  In contrast, the TCE 
theory of the family firm may be more promising in explaining the above duality, and providing 
predictions as to when high longevity can be expected, as we explain below. 
TCE AND THE FAMILY FIRM 
TCE’s core premise is that economic actors will select and retain the most efficient governance 
mechanisms to conduct exchanges, by aligning governance mechanisms with the attributes of a 
given transaction (or a set of transactions), in a cost-economizing way (Hennart, 1994; 
Williamson, 1981, 1996). The Williamsonian version of TCE is built upon three core 
assumptions: asset specificity, bounded rationality, and opportunism (Williamson, 1996). In 
subsequent work, the concept of bounded reliability was introduced as an alternative to the 
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narrow assumption of opportunism (Kano & Verbeke, 2015; Verbeke & Greidanus, 2009).2  
Ultimately, sustainability of governance (which, in the case of family firms, means survival and 
longevity as family businesses) results from the firm’s ability to select and deploy a mix of 
governance mechanisms that allow economizing in contracting, and to adjust these mechanisms 
over time (Hennart, 1994). 
The sustained efficiency of governance mechanisms (relative to real world alternatives) is 
tied to macro-level shift parameters characterizing the environment in which the firm operates. 
These shift parameters, e.g., “changes in property rights, contract laws, norms, customs, and the 
like” (Williamson, 1996, p. 223), represent the essence of the evolution of the firm’s broader 
environment, and must be taken into account in the unfolding of governance over time.  
Changes in the macro environment can be abrupt, for example because of revolutions, and 
coups d’état. When these changes occur, firms become exposed to new bounded reliability issues, 
because extant economizing instruments, such as previously optimal market contract clauses, 
may become misaligned (Gao, Zuzul, Jones, & Khanna., 2017). Macro-level shocks may 
negatively affect third parties the firm has contracts with, making them unable to fulfill their 
commitments to the firm.   
Longevity requires the ability to economize not only on macro-level shocks, but also, 
more broadly, on macro-level institutional frailties (e.g., a weak property rights regime), which 
can exacerbate bounded rationality and bounded reliability challenges in all transactions, and thus 
                                                 
2Bounded reliability explains instances of commitment non-fulfillment that occur due to a variety of reasons 
including, but not limited to, strong-form self-interest. These reasons fall into three distinct categories: (1) 
opportunism; (2) benevolent preference reversal; and (3) identity-based discordance. Scholars espousing the concept 
of bounded reliability argue that governance systems should be designed so as to economize on bounded rationality 
and bounded reliability (and not exclusively opportunism) of economic actors involved in transactions. In this study, 
we adopt the concept of bounded reliability, rather than the narrower concept of opportunism, as a core behavioral 
assumption. 
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create uncertainties that hinder contracting generally, e.g., when contracts are unlikely to be 
enforceable through the route of legal recourse.  
Comparative efficacy of governance mechanisms varies with the macro environment on 
the one hand, and the micro-level attributes of economic actors – that is, bounded rationality and 
reliability – on the other (Williamson, 1996). In a family firm, the core behavioural assumptions 
of TCE take on a unique form. First, family firms are characterized by family-based asset 
specificity (Verbeke & Kano, 2010), whereby, e.g., family members employed by the firm, 
heritage product lines or physical resources, or particular ingrained routines, cannot be adjusted 
and redeployed as quickly and efficiently as in a firm with dispersed ownership (Pollak, 1985). 
Second, because of family-based asset specificity, family firms experience unique bounded 
rationality and bounded reliability challenges, whereby family-based resources and non-family 
ones (e.g., professional managers) can be subjected to differential treatment. Here, family-based 
resources are associated with a positive affect and treated by default as valuable heritage assets.  
In contrast, non-family resources are associated with a negative affect and viewed as 
commodities, regardless of the actual value-creating potential of these resources for the firm. This 
systematic pattern of differential treatment of two resource categories, or BB (Chua, Chrisman, 
Steier, & Rau, 2012; Verbeke & Kano, 2012), is expressed in a unique set of affect-based 
decision rules and routines in family firms that are dysfunctional and restrict the firm’s access to 
– and efficient usage of – requisite resources.  As such, BB has three main features.  It is the 
product of family-based asset specificity; it represents a unique expression of bounded rationality, 
whereby an affect bias clouds decision makers’ judgment and preferences when selecting 
decision rules and routines; and it can act as a trigger of bounded reliability in some family firms, 
e.g., when technically incompetent family managers, through being appointed to high office, can 
obstruct competent non-family managers, who may in turn become demotivated and unreliable, 
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and ultimately leave the firm. While not all family firms are bifurcation biased, they are by 
default more susceptible to BB than their non-family counterparts, and this contributes to explain 
their overall, low rates of survival  (Kano & Verbeke, 2018).  
Mainstream TCE acknowledges a feedback effect between the macro-environment and 
the individual (Williamson, 1996), but its core focus is on transaction-related efficiency. In 
contrast, the ways in which individual attributes can affect the firm’s interactions with macro-
level shift parameters are not a typical subject of study in TCE.  Below, we do address such 
interactions in the family firm context. More specifically, we explain how family firms can use 
corporate diplomacy processes to economize on bifurcation bias.  
CORPORATE DIPLOMACY AS AN ECONOMIZING STRATEGY IN FAMILY FIRMS 
Corporate diplomacy and social capital 
Corporate diplomacy can be defined in managerial terms as “an attempt to manage systematically 
and professionally the business environment in such a way as to ensure that business is done 
smoothly” (Steger, 2003, p. 18). The concept originated in the field of international relations, and 
is fairly new to management research, where it has been used predominantly to explain responses 
by firms to political and social forces in the global economy (Westermann-Behaylo, Rehbein, & 
Fort, 2013). Management scholars who study corporate diplomacy have identified a range of 
objectives of corporate diplomacy processes, including adaptation to volatile and fragmented 
environments, meeting expectations of diverse stakeholders (Steger, 2003), dealing with 
exogenous crises (Saner, Yiu, & Søndergaard, 2000), increasing legitimacy (Ordeix-Rigo & 
Duarte, 2009), and cultivating a long-term organizational mindset (Henisz, 2014). 
At the core of corporate diplomacy, and often coinciding with its definition, is the 
management of relationships with stakeholders (Westermann-Behaylo et al., 2015), which 
supports a firm’s ‘license to operate’. Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte (2009, p. 557) argue that:  
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“corporate diplomacy is a way to strengthen the network of stakeholder relationships for a 
company and thus a valid stakeholder management strategy”. These stakeholder relationships are 
embedded in, and facilitated by, inter-personal relationships, which link organizations. Many of 
the components of corporate diplomacy, such as dialogue, bidirectional processes, participatory 
decision-making, and engagement with society, can ultimately be viewed as process elements 
strengthening the firm’s social capital.  In business firms, social capital in the form of network 
ties, functions as a governance mechanism facilitating economic transactions (cf. Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998: p. 243). Henisz (2016) and Saner et al. (2000), though not establishing a link with 
the social capital construct, emphasize that corporate diplomacy is about developing relationships 
outside of the firm, at multiple levels, as a means to establish mutual understanding.  
Family firms supposedly command unique social capital (as compared with nonfamily 
firms) to support their economic transactions (Chrisman et al., 2011). The family, because of its 
clear boundaries, and because it is a locus for repeated exchange, facilitates the development of 
social capital (Coleman, 1988). Family firms benefit from access to kinship networks and 
typically also maintain historical and social ties with their communities; these ties, as well as 
flexibility in building long-term reciprocal relationships with stakeholders, are argued to provide 
family firms with social capital advantages over their nonfamily counterparts, whose 
relationships are constrained by formal procedures and structures, as well as short-term 
shareholder-driven considerations (Acquaah, 2012).  
Sociologists distinguish between bonding social capital and bridging social capital. 
Bonding social capital signifies ‘closure’, and defines boundaries separating the members of a 
group, who share specific collective goods, from non-members (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Putnam, 
2000). Bridging social capital refers to ties among otherwise unconnected people and groups 
(Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010), which support the circulation of ideas across different social 
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contexts (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Burt, 2004), and provide access to financial and human resources 
(Kang, 2003; Putnam, 2000). The challenge for family firms is to combine their unique bonding 
social capital in the realm of family ties (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010), with bonding social capital 
within the firm, but beyond family ties, and with bridging social capital.  
As suggested above, social capital and corporate diplomacy processes can be given a TCE 
interpretation.  The essence of social capital as a governance mechanism, resides in the ties 
connecting individuals and groups.  These ties can support the economic efficiency of 
transactions, to the extent that they reduce information asymmetries and reliability challenges.  
By deploying corporate diplomacy processes, family firms can strengthen their foundational 
bonding social capital advantage in the realm of family ties, and extend it to non-family ties 
inside the firm, and to bridging social capital with external stakeholders, thereby reducing BB 
and fostering longevity.  In the spirit of Ordeix-Rigo and Duarte (2009), a distinction can be 
made among three process steps (focused here on bridging social capital): 
1. Familiarity: Here, the firm aims to become more familiar with outside stakeholders, and 
to familiarize these stakeholders with the firm. 
2. Acceptance: The aim of this step is to align corporate values – and achieve recognition of 
a fundamental similarity – with stakeholder values, so that the stakeholders would view 
the firm as a value-creating party.  
3. Engagement: Firms strive to co-create value with – and for – the stakeholders. 
Family firms can implement these steps to economize on BB so as to both effectively 
respond to macro-level shift parameters and to sustain efficient governance at the firm level. 
Further, family firms can utilize corporate diplomacy steps to transmit economizing practices to 
subsequent generations, in order to support longevity. First, externally, in the realm of bridging 
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social capital, family firms must have a keen awareness of their environment and stakeholders; 
accept stakeholders outside of the immediate kinship circle as relevant; and engage with them 
meaningfully so as to mitigate external shocks. Second, internally, and more in the realm of 
bonding social capital, founding families must familiarize themselves with non-family assets 
(both human and non-human), accept those assets as non-commodity, and engage with them in a 
meaningful way so as to achieve efficiency and create long-lasting value for the firm. Third, 
again in the realm of bonding social capital, but related to family ties, cross-generational 
transmission of efficient practices and access to the firm’s entire reservoir of social capital, 
follows the same processes, whereby future generations of family are purposefully socialized to 
achieve familiarity and acceptance, and reciprocal engagement between generations (whether 
structured or unstructured). 
The above tripod of corporate diplomacy process-steps leading to augmented social 
capital, complements the conventional TCE arsenal of economizing tools that seldom focuses on 
process-related antecedents to effective governance mechanisms. In the following sections, we 
describe how family firms can apply the three processes of corporate diplomacy to sustain 
longevity. Our arguments are summarized in Table 1.  
(Insert Table 1about here) 
Corporate diplomacy: Macro level and outside actors 
Family firm scholars have identified the ability to manage stakeholder relationships by using the 
family’s social capital as one of the explanations for the long-term survival of some family firms 
(Sharma, 2008; Miller & Le-Breton Miller, 2005; Ward, 2004). Although the immediate 
advantage of family firms is the social capital residing in the family acting as a governance tool, 
the family’s set of extended relationships can also support economic transactions in ways not 
available to a non-family firm (Carr, Cole, Ring, & Blettner, 2011). For example, relatives that 
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do not work in the firm can act as bridges, linking family managers with distant social groups, 
such as, for example, an NGO that holds adversarial views of the firm and would otherwise be 
closed to the idea of constructively communicating with it.  
Family-based social ties are unique in that they become established over a long term and 
permeate both the family and the firm domains (Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003). 
Family-based social ties complement conventional contractual mechanisms for economizing on 
bounded reliability in contexts where institutional environments are weak or uncertain. Due to 
their complexity and embeddedness, these ties are difficult for competitors to imitate (Stadler, 
Mayer, Hautz, & Matzler, 2018), and the continuity of succession enables family firms to 
maintain and exploit their social networks more effectively and over the long run (Le Breton-
Miller & Miller, 2006; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The shorter managerial tenures and performance 
horizons of non-family firms make it difficult to develop and maintain stakeholder relationships 
that help manage macro-level shifts (Henisz, 2016).  
 Family firms start with a governance advantage, because they can rely on family-based 
social capital, amassed over a long period of time (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). However, family 
firms are also particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of ‘social closure’, that is, 
circumstances where a firm prioritizes transactions with stakeholders based on pre-existing 
network ties, without evaluating real-world alternatives (Ostrom, 2000; Gargiulo & Benassi, 
2000). Further, family firms’ social ties are often local and restricted to a selected group of 
‘trusted’ individuals and organizations (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; 
Stadler et al., 2018). These ties limit the firm’s growth, as it becomes challenging for 
internationally or functionally diversified family firms to continuously rely on a limited spectrum 
of network ties for complex transactions (Arregle et al., 2007).  The challenge arises when family 
firms become entrenched in ‘special’ relationships, to the exclusion of other relevant partners – 
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e.g., family firms may be slow to change trusted suppliers even when there are performance 
problems (Uhlaner, van Goor-Balk, & Masurel, 2004), or to accept non-kin/non-family 
stakeholders as potentially reliable (Reuber, 2016). These issues can be characterized as 
expressions of BB in the realm of bridging social capital.  Here, the three steps of corporate 
diplomacy facilitate economizing on BB. 
Reciprocal familiarization. This first step of corporate diplomacy entails that the family 
firm should develop familiarity with features and capabilities of a broad range of stakeholders, 
both current and potential, beyond those that are already linked to the family via existing social 
capital.  Contextual awareness, resulting from the constant scanning of the macro environment 
and associated players, is a critical ingredient of familiarization. Macro-level shift parameters 
bring with them shifting stakeholder relevance. Family firm managers must identify relevant 
players in the changing environment, with whom reciprocal links should be established. These 
actors may include political figures, actors in relevant non-market institutions that can contribute 
relevant knowledge, as well as commercial intermediaries and potential partners (Kano, 2018). At 
the same time, the continued relevance of current linkages must be assessed, so as to determine 
whether present linkages with external actors are advancing or limiting the firm’s adaptation to 
its macro-environment, and whether they maintain their economic value (Seigal, 2007).  
 The familiarization step is necessarily reciprocal, which means that the firm must also 
become familiar to a broad range of stakeholders (the market, potential partners and 
intermediaries, institutional stakeholders, etc.). In the context of a family firm, this includes 
familiarizing the environment not only with the firm’s economic value proposition, but also with 
the ‘family angle’. This includes communicating the family identity (as it relates to the way the 
business is run) to external stakeholders and providing relevant “family persona cues” 
(Parmentier, 2011, p. 222). The family can present itself as a guarantor of continuity or a 
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guardian of the craft (Micelotta & Raynard, 2011). For example, locally oriented firms in the 
hospitality sector frequently focus their external communications on conveying the message that 
family involvement implies continuity of business and adherence to traditions (Blombäck & 
Craig, 2014). Family firms producing luxury goods or, more broadly, substantially differentiated 
products, may communicate the family’s involvement as an indication of a “craft mentality” 
(Hennart, Majocchi, & Forlani, 2017, p. 10) and a signal of quality. This communication 
typically happens through a number of public channels, including company websites, traditional 
media, social media, published materials, visual cues (Blombäck & Craig, 2014; Parmentier, 
2011), as well as informal communication with stakeholders. 
Mutual acceptance. In this second step, family firms seek to become known to outside 
stakeholders as an attractive, capable and honest partner. Mutual acceptance entails going beyond 
familiarization, towards recognizing elements of consistency between the firm’s value system 
and that of the surrounding society and its stakeholders.  
In terms of gaining acceptance from relevant societal stakeholders, family firms are 
argued to have a natural advantage over their non-family counterparts. Acceptance can be 
accomplished through forging a family firm’s reputation for honest business dealings, and family 
firms are known for their preoccupation with having a good reputation in their location of origin, 
which facilitates the alignment of values between firm and society, instrumental to long term 
survival (Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Ordeix-Rigo & Duarte, 2009). The family’s identification with 
the firm creates strong incentives for developing a reputation for integrity (Berrone et al., 2012). 
Further, family firms are frequently associated with such qualities as a human touch and 
authenticity, which contributes to positive business reputation (Westwood, 1997). But the 
challenge for all firms, family and nonfamily ones, is to accept as legitimate the views of a 
variety of stakeholders whose claims may become more salient as the result of changing macro-
 16 
level conditions (such as shifts in government regulations), including those with no explicit 
connections to the family, and those who in earlier periods may have been viewed as fringe 
stakeholders.  The one advantage of family firms in the realm of developing new bridging capital, 
is that family members can provide continuity in the process of crafting mutual acceptance.  
Mellerio, the oldest jewelry producer in the world, developed stakeholder relationships in 
multiple countries and with different, even adversarial, groups, through personal involvement of 
its family employees. The mutual acceptance helped the firm, and the family, survive dramatic 
macro-level shifts, including the French Revolution. Had the firm relied solely on the family’s 
immediate circle of stakeholders, mostly clients in the French Royal Court by the 1780s, it might 
have suffered the same faith as most Court members, that is, death by guillotine. As another 
example, Asian family business groups have a long history of navigating political and industrial 
change by forging lasting relationships with relevant governments (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010). 
Mutual engagement. At this stage, the family firm establishes itself as an attractive 
business partner and valuable community member. The family firm is able to influence society, 
and in turn willing to adapt and change in order to advance relevant interests of the community 
and its diverse members. Long-term commercial success is contingent on engagement with a 
variety of outside actors who can subsequently advance the firm’s business. At the mutual 
engagement stage, the family firm solidifies partnerships with outside actors who can advance its 
business interests; these ties can facilitate long-term inter-firm cooperation and be associated with 
credible mutual commitments, which involve bilateral asset-specific investment by partners, 
referred to in TCE as a ‘hostage exchange’.  As was the case in the acceptance process step, 
family firm members can typically provide more continuity in the engagement process than 
nonfamily firms.  Zara, IKEA, and H&M are known for long-lasting and stable relationships with 
a variety of international suppliers (Pongelli, Calabrò, & Basco, 2018). Specifically, IKEA’s 
 17 
decades-long relationships with globally dispersed suppliers, have been associated with mutual 
asset-specific investments: IKEA provides suppliers with significant technological support, and 
suppliers invest in learning and technological upgrading (Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2011).  
It has been repeatedly argued that the family character of the business positively impacts 
family firms’ relationships with various constituencies (Uhlaner et al., 2004), and that family 
firms have a natural advantage at forging committed, lasting ties with outside stakeholders. 
Family firms’ extensive engagement with external parties has been empirically shown to improve 
performance by filling potential gaps in the political, social and economic infrastructures of 
external markets where the firms operate (Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009).  
The direct involvement of the family and senior family firm leaders in philanthropy and 
political activities supports the firm’s continued engagement with different groups of 
stakeholders, and signals the firm’s long-term commitment to the community loci where it 
operates – consider, for example, the Du Pont family’s long-standing involvement in local 
politics (Chandler & Salsbury, 1971). As stated by Pearson et al. (2008, p. 961): “The family’s 
existing structure and long-standing internal relationships help build the stability necessary to 
generate social capital. Families bring with them into the economic decisions associated with a 
business both a shared history over time and relatively durable, lasting relationships”. The 
continuity of the family as a social group supports the continuity of relationships between the 
firm and stakeholders. Family managers’ longer tenures make them more appealing interlocutors 
for stakeholders that wish to establish a dialogue with the business, and pre-existing family ties 
and family history can support mutual engagement, for example via shared values or symbols.   
Like the family firm itself, community stakeholders may be on the receiving end of positive and 
negative spillovers from macro-level events (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derf, 2006; 
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Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). 
Prior, long-term engagement in developing bridging capital can thus determine whether the 
community opportunistically turns against a family (and its businesses) and tries to benefit from 
exogenous shocks, e.g., by stealing property, or, on the contrary, helps the firm withstand shocks 
(Gao et al., 2017). The importance of long-term community engagement helps explain family 
firms’ heightened emphasis on ethical practices and philanthropic behavior (Campopiano & De 
Massis, 2015; Campopiano, De Massis, & Chirico, 2014). 
This strategy is actively pursued by Frescobaldi, an Italian family firm that has been 
producing wine for over 700 years.  During WWII, Frescobaldis’ most important wine 
production site was first occupied, then bombed, by the Nazis, causing significant economic loss. 
The family escaped, helped by the local population, and by a large network of stakeholders, 
including the family firm’s employees.  A contemporary example of the family’s corporate 
diplomacy activities is its involvement in producing Gorgona – a wine made by prisoners on the 
island of Gorgona, a penitentiary, through a partnership with local authorities. The Frescobaldi 
family organized and financed the project, which it thinks has a great symbolic and social value, 
and which has been widely praised in the industry (Wislocki, 2017).  
 To summarize, achieving longevity requires continuous adaptation to macro-level shift 
parameters, which, in turn, is contingent on co-opting a broad range of stakeholders, beyond 
those directly linked to the family. Family firms hold a foundational advantage in deploying 
bonding social capital in the realm of family ties, but they must consciously employ corporate 
diplomacy processes to develop bridging capital, which is only possible if they are unimpeded by 
BB.  In the absence of BB, the possibility of long-term continuity in the acceptance and 
engagement steps through utilizing family members and reputational resources, gives family 
firms an edge over nonfamily ones.  
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Corporate diplomacy and BB: Firm level 
Distinct features ascribed to family firms often stem from the bonding social capital that links 
family members. Bonding social capital as a governance mechanism promotes commitment and 
conflict resolution, and facilitates acquiring valuable resources (Portes, 1998). Non-family 
employees, by definition, are not part of the closed social group that is the family (Adler & 
Kwon, 2002). The family’s bonding social capital can have an exclusionary effect, leading to, 
and reinforcing, BB.  Family firms thus have a unique governance mechanism at their disposal in 
the form of family-related bonding social capital, but BB may prevent proper usage thereof in 
business transactions. Dysfunctional family ties might even prevent further development of 
bonding social capital that would extend beyond family ties.  Here again, corporate diplomacy 
process steps can be deployed to economize on BB at the firm level. 
Reciprocal familiarization. Family firm insiders are known to possess a high level of 
familiarity with each other’s conduct and expertise; this familiarity arises from family 
relationships, or the bonding social capital of the family (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lubatkin, 
Durand, & Ling, 2007), and is reinforced by early socialization of family members into the 
company (Lee, Lim, & Lim, 2003). Non-family managers do not benefit from the prolonged 
socialization of family members. As a result, non-family employees do not possess the same 
degree of idiosyncratic knowledge about the company as family insiders, nor does the company 
know them to the same extent (Verbeke & Kano, 2012).  
Improving the founding family’s understanding of non-family employees’ conduct and 
expertise, and transferring idiosyncratic knowledge about the firm to non-family managers, are 
the objectives of the familiarization stage. Mutual familiarization can be achieved through both 
formal and informal channels. Family firms can share information through forums and meetings, 
and provide employees with access to documentation/archives that contain information about the 
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firm.  Non-family employees should be socialized into the routines, shared stories, and symbols 
of the firm. Notably, most of the Henokiens, a club of family firms that have survived for over 
200 years, report using specific practices, such as family meetings where non-family employees 
are invited, and celebrations of specific moments of the firm’s history, in order to inform non-
family employees about the firm, its history, its values, and to get to know non-family employees 
through repeated social interactions.  
Mutual acceptance. At the acceptance stage, the fundamental similarity in the value 
systems of the family, the firm and non-family employees is recognized, and these values are 
enacted through the firm’s strategy. Acceptance, however, may be more challenging than 
familiarizing for the founding family. “Amoral familism” (Banfield, 1958, p. 83), defined as 
dysfunctional distrust of outsiders, is a well-documented expression of BB (Dyer, 2006; Verbeke 
& Kano, 2012). It manifests itself as a refusal to accept non-family employees as valid end equal 
contributors to the firm. The lack of acceptance can damage relationships and create a “vicious 
cycle of increasing bounded reliability” (Verbeke & Kano, 2012, p. 1193) between family and 
non-family employees.  
Acceptance of outsiders is reflected in the willingness to share power and legitimacy – 
e.g., allowing a non-family CEO to make and implement strategic decisions – which is “one of 
the hardest issues for family firms to come to terms with” (Cadbury, 2000, p. 8). Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, a former chairman of Cadbury Ltd., a third generation, British family-owned 
confectionary firm, argues that the family shareholders’ role is to act as the guardians of values, 
and to help non-family executives understand the family firm’s philosophy. Yet, when it comes 
to strategic and operational decision-making power, the family must accept that “there should be 
no doubt where the power to make decisions lies. It is solely with the executives in charge of 
running the business” (Cadbury, 2000: 24). These executives, in turn, must accept the firm’s 
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original philosophy and operate accordingly.  Even more than with familiarization, mutual 
acceptance hinges on systemic information exchange (see reciprocal familiarization discussed 
above), whereby the family provides counsel to assist executives in their task, and the executives 
keep the family informed.  
Acceptance thus means that non-family managers’ power to make decisions and the 
legitimacy of these decisions is accepted without excessive scrutiny by the family. If non-family 
members do not have the power to structure business transactions according to economizing 
principles, inefficiencies will ensue. For example, Peugeot, a French automotive family firm, had 
non-family CEOs for decades, but strategies proposed by these executives (e.g., relocation of 
production and cooperative entry into foreign markets) often conflicted with the family’s pursuit 
of non-economic goals, such as maintaining a high share of production in France in spite of high 
costs, and avoiding alliances to retain full operational control of the firm. The lack of mutual 
acceptance between the family and its CEOs ultimately eroded the legitimacy of the non-family 
executives, resulting not only in a high turnover of senior managers, but also in increasingly 
inefficient operations, declining sales and mounting debt. Peugeot’s fortunes changed when the 
family, facing a brush with bankruptcy, shifted its stance and began deferring strategic decisions 
to external CEOs.3 Under Carlos Tavares, a non-family CEO in charge since 2014, Peugeot went 
through a vigorous recovery, punctuated by a reversal of previous strategies linked to preferences 
of the family: the firm forged new alliances and increased the role of external investors to support 
international expansion (Dupont-Calbo & Amiot, 2017; Fainsilber, 2014).  
                                                 
3
The change in stance towards acceptance of non-family executives was possible only after a family feud between 
the two brothers who led the firm at the time was solved, and Thierry Peugeot, the brother deemed responsible for 
hindering alliances and undermining external CEOs’ decisions, was pushed out of the firm (Dupont-Calbo & Amiot, 
2017). Since then, the family and executives have been mutually accepting their respective authority and decisions.    
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Mutual engagement.  As far as the interaction between the family and nonfamily top 
managers is concerned, it is difficult to disentangle mutual acceptance and engagement.  These 
two process steps almost coincide, in the sense that accepting a senior executive’s perspective on 
the family business goes hand in hand with empowering this executive to conduct business 
transactions as she or he sees fit.  But for lower-level employees, mutual engagement is a clearly 
distinct process step, going much further than acceptance.  
At the individual level, engagement implies the cognitive and emotional investment of an 
individual into his or her work (Kahn, 1990). Barrick, Thurgood, Smith, and Courtright (2015) 
adapted Kahn’s conception of engagement to a collective organizational level, and defined 
organizational engagement as the shared perception of organizational members’ requisite levels 
of investment and commitment. We build upon this work to conceptualize a family firm’s 
engagement with its non-family employees as the shared perception among family members of 
the family’s level of investment in, and commitment to, non-family members inside the firm. The 
desired outcome of mutual engagement in a family business is firm-wide commitment to the 
purpose and values of the firm (whereby non-family employees are fully co-opted into the firm), 
and a reciprocal endorsement of the firm as an attractive employer by the non-family employees 
(Ordeix-Rigo & Duarte, 2009). Mutual engagement supports longevity in that it results in longer 
employee tenure/low turnover, long-term collaborations, and ultimately improved firm-level 
performance outcomes (Barrick et al., 2015; Kahn, 1990). 
In practical terms, mutual engagement implies that non-family employees are invested in 
the vision, mission, and value of the firm, and the family is committed to non-family employees 
as long-term members of the team. This commitment can be reinforced informally through 
socialization, and formally through the sharing of both rewards and liabilities among parties (both 
financial and non-financial), and through merit-based (rather than particularistic) human 
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resources practices, particularly in the realm of rewards and incentives. Merit-based incentives 
stimulate mutual engagement by signalling to non-family employees that the family values their 
contribution. Equity sharing is fairly uncommon in family firms due to families’ reluctance to 
dilute ownership, but some successful, long-lived family firms, such as Du Pont, have offered 
employees shares in the business (Chandler & Salsbury, 1971), to solidify mutual commitments.  
Family businesses are naturally well positioned to foster mutual engagement within the 
firm, thereby augmenting their bonding social capital beyond family ties.  Yet, empirical 
evidence suggests that family members have a significantly greater level of engagement in their 
firms than non-family employees (Ramos, Man, Mustafa, & Ng, 2014).  The bonding social 
capital related to family ties, thus appears more robust than that related to ties with non-family 
employees. The most successful family firms therefore make it a priority to meaningfully engage 
with, and demonstrate commitment to, non-family talent, and receive reciprocal commitment. 
Frescobaldi introduced engagement practices as early as in the 17th century, making Francesco 
Mazinghi, a non-family executive, a minority shareholder in the firm (Frescobaldi, Solinas, & 
Tosi, 2004). The youngest generation of managers believes that the company’s success over the 
past fifty years is due largely to the fact that professional managers and employees are made “feel 
that it’s their company” (interview with Matteo Frescobaldi, 2017). Matteo Frescobaldi clarified 
this point as follows: 
“I cannot think of any situation where the family has what employees do not have. We 
have the same discount for the products as employees. If we want to take some wine, we 
have to buy it. Our properties are for company use, and no family member can use the 
estate for personal purposes. Managers of the estates are not family members, but they 
feel like the estate is their own.”  
 
Merck, a German family firm producing drugs and chemicals since the 17th century, 
facilitates engagement by ensuring that all the executives who are members of its Board share the 
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same risks and advantages of family members by becoming shareholders, but also accept 
unlimited personal liability for up to five years after retirement. Jon Baumhauer, Chairman of 
Merck’s Executive Board and the 11th generation family member, affirmed in an interview that 
“...it is important for all member of the Executive Board, even non-shareholders, to share both the 
risks and rewards of the owners” (quoted in Leleux & Glemser, 2011, p. 12).  
Corporate diplomacy across levels: Cascading effects 
Corporate diplomacy results in augmented bridging social capital (ties with outsiders, including 
stakeholders in the macro-environment) and bonding social capital (ties inside the firm). These 
various types of social capital, as governance mechanisms, interact in a ‘cascading’ way: The 
firm’s corporate diplomacy actions targeted toward economizing on BB in either sphere will 
create positive impacts across levels (firm versus macro-environment), domains (economic, 
social, political and institutional) and time periods. For example, the reputation of a firm as an 
attractive employer (bonding capital outcome of corporate diplomacy at the firm level) may 
trigger a broader positive reputation in the community and create goodwill with regulators 
(augmented bridging social capital).  Here, the reputation of Mellerio and Frescobaldi as reliable 
business partners and fair employers, supported broader stakeholder relationships, helping them 
survive, especially in times of extreme macro-level volatility, such as, respectively, the French 
Revolution and World War II.  Similarly, a firm’s reputation in the business community, i.e., its 
reputation as an attractive business partner (reflecting bridging social capital in the business 
contracting sphere) reinforces the public perception of the firm as a desirable employer, thus 
augmenting bridging social capital with stakeholders in the macro-environment. 
On the negative side, BB, whereby non-family employees are treated unfairly as 
compared to family members (reducing bonding social capital), will send negative signals to 
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external stakeholders (thereby reducing bridging social capital).  In turn, failing to accept 
particular external stakeholders (reducing bridging social capital), may cause hostility by non-
family employees, if the latter have a shared identity and common values with such external 
stakeholders (thereby reducing bonding social capital outside of the family ties). A firm that is 
disengaged from the social context in which it operates (reduced bridging social capital) may also 
find it hard to attract talent (reduced potential for bonding social capital), thereby igniting 
additional bounded rationality and reliability challenges.   
 Importantly, positive cascading effects can sustain the firm’s overall social capital over 
longer periods of time, but corporate diplomacy efforts must be maintained in order to have a 
lasting impact. The Fiat Group, an Italian carmaker owned by the Agnelli family, offers an 
illustration. The history of Fiat was punctuated by successful corporate diplomacy efforts both 
internally and externally. Internally, the Agnelli family identified and hired talented non-family 
managers, accepted the value they brought to the firm, and engaged with them fully. Externally, 
the family navigated macro-level contextual changes successfully by engaging with stakeholders 
who drove such changes, for example moving from being one of the leading suppliers of military 
equipment for the Fascist regime to becoming a key recipient of the US-funded Marshall Plan aid 
in Italy, and the largest industrial firm of the post-war economic miracle. When, however, the 
ailing Giovanni Agnelli resisted adapting business deals he personally negotiated with 
authoritarian regimes (e.g., in Spain, the USSR, and Yugoslavia) to the new political context of 
the 1990s, Fiat entered a dramatic period of decline. Fiat’s struggles were exacerbated by 
Agnelli’s insistence on hiring ‘old guard’ managers, with whom he had personal ties. The firm 
turned around after Agnelli’s death, under the leadership of Sergio Marchionne, a non-family 
CEO (Volpato, 2008; Tagliabue, 2003).  
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TRANSGENERATIONAL DISSEMINATION OF GOVERNANCE PRACTICES: 
APPLICATION OF CORPORATE DIPLOMACY PROCESSES 
Corporate diplomacy efforts offer family firms an opportunity to strengthen their overall social 
capital as a governance mechanism. However, the challenge is to maintain for the next generation 
the resulting, improved ties inside the firm with non-family members, as well as stronger ties 
with outside business stakeholders, and with stakeholders at the macro-level.  To achieve 
longevity, each subsequent generation of family members in the firm must be able to access and 
rely upon the existing pool of network ties functioning as a governance tool to support economic 
transactions (Hall, Melin, & Nordqvist, 2001; Lumpkin, Martin & Vaughn, 2008).  Guaranteeing 
access to – and ability to rely on – the entirety of extant network ties can be facilitated through 
the three corporate diplomacy steps, which in this case aim to (a) improve the family ties among 
different generations, and (b) involve the younger generation in the broader pool of ties held with 
multiple stakeholders. 
Reciprocal familiarization. The current generation must ensure that successive 
generations in the family become familiar with the business, while the current generation is 
familiar with the next generation’s set of competencies.  This occurs through cross-generational 
communication of stories, traditions, rituals and relational laws (Lumpkin et al., 2008). Formal 
documents outlining the firm’s set of values, organization and governance principles – e.g., a 
family constitution or a family protocol – present a structured way to share relevant information 
across generations. The current generation can invite upcoming generations to participate in 
family meetings and events, promote the family archives, share family-specific publications, and 
organize a forum – e.g., a family intranet – where information about the family and the firm is 
shared. Cohabitation/co-location, where multiple generations of family involved in the business 
reside in close proximity, is an effective way to achieve mutual familiarization, and is frequently 
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practiced by old family firms, particularly those involved in agriculture – for example, the 
Frescobaldi maintain a family estate that serves as corporate headquarters but also houses three 
generations of family employees; all family members joining the business are expected to 
relocate to the residence. 
Mutual acceptance.  At this stage, younger generations accept their role in the family, and 
the firm’s value system.  In turn, older generations accept potential value and contribution 
brought by the younger generation. Successive generations need to accept strategic decisions 
made by current and prior leadership, which may be difficult particularly if decisions are 
controversial and/or involve shedding assets that hold an emotional value for the family (Salvato 
& Melin, 2008).  Such mutual acceptance hinges on open communication (discussed in the 
familiarization process stage above) and is frequently achieved through informal socialization, 
whereby younger generations are groomed practically from birth. However, many successful 
family firms run formal mentorship programs, where upcoming generations are educated on the 
realities of the business in a practical setting, including especially the existing network ties 
maintained by the firm.  
A more formal approach to cross-generational mutual acceptance implies that family 
protocols are treated as agreements, whereby different generations of family are expected to sign 
a document outlining mutually agreed upon values. This practice, followed by a number of 
Henokiens, ensures that governance principles are aligned with aspirations and ideas of younger 
generations (Tàpies & Fernández Moya, 2012). 
Finally, mutual acceptance assumes that subsequent generations must have the freedom to 
adapt governance mechanisms, including the firm’s reservoir of social ties, to match their skills 
and capabilities, and relevant contextual changes (i.e., macro-level shift parameters, business 
trends, competitive pressures, etc.). This means that knowledge on an agreed upon, core set of 
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values and practices as well as network relationships, must leave sufficient room to incorporate 
unique values and preferences for new practices and network ties of the next generation (cf. 
Tàpies & Fernández Moya, 2012).  
Mutual engagement. Here, older generations engage younger generations and empower 
them to contribute to the firm, for example, by suggesting new social ties to be created and taking 
responsibility for new products or ventures. These ideas can be solicited formally, through 
channels that allow for an assessment and implementation of suggestions that arise across 
generations. Some family firms engage new generations from an early age through internships, 
and develop formal career plans for family members who wish to join the firm. Cross-
generational initiatives, such as technical and professional forums, further co-opt younger 
generations of family into the firm. Finally, different generations can be asked to work jointly on 
large projects with important social capital implications – for example, managing a joint venture 
(Salvato & Melin, 2008) or leading a corporate restructuring (Chandler & Salsbury, 1971).  
Merck provides rich examples of how corporate diplomacy processes are utilized to 
transmit core practices across generations. Presently 130 of Merck’s 200 family members are 
shareholders of the firm. Merck Magna Carta, a document dating back to the 1800s, formally 
outlines the firm’s values, organization, and governance principles. The document serves as a 
reference point for family members who want to learn about the business. A family magazine and 
a family-specific intranet facilitate familiarization by keeping the family informed and updated 
on the activities of the firm. Further, family members enter formal business mentorship programs 
from the age of 15, and are introduced to each other, to older generations, and to the broader 
network through targeted events, such as joint non-business trips, which support mutual 
acceptance. Finally, engagement is cultivated by ensuring the continuous involvement of family 
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members in the business, encouraging participation in the firm’s multiple internship programs 
from a young age, and the exchange of written opinions and ideas through the family intranet and 
internal documents and memos; ideas are also exchanged across generations and branches of the 
family at annual meetings. The family organizes technical events aimed at discussing matters 
related to accounting, scientific research, as well as governance of the firm, and trips visiting 
foreign subsidiaries. The Chairman of the Family Board has stated that he explicitly welcomes 
new ideas from younger family members. Employment options are open to family members who 
have suitable qualifications. However, family applicants are subjected to clear, transparent, 
meritocratic criteria and a formal interview process carried out by non-family employees, thus 
strengthening bonding social capital. Upon acceptance, family members discuss a career 
development plan with senior managers. This process ensures that their ambitions and ideas are 
formally screened, but also given serious consideration (Leleux & Glemser, 2011).  
CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
In this study, we have addressed the family firm longevity paradox, that is, the extreme variation 
in the lifespan of family firms. A small set of family businesses has outlived all other types of 
firms, yet many family firms underperform and die before third trans-generational succession. 
We have argued that there are two related reasons for this duality, highlighting necessary 
conditions for longevity. First, family firms that exhibit exceptional longevity have been able to 
overcome economizing challenges brought about by bifurcation bias, both in their business 
transactions and broader transactions with the macro-level environment. Second, these successful 
economizing practices were effectively transmitted across generations. The three process steps of 
corporate diplomacy, namely familiarization, acceptance, and engagement, facilitate successful 
economizing practices and the transmission thereof.  These corporate diplomacy steps lead to 
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augmented bonding and bridging social capital, i.e., ties that are a key governance mechanism in 
support of business and broader transactions. 
Family firms have an intrinsic governance advantage in terms of their bonding social 
capital, to the extent that this involves family ties. Yet, relying on family-based social capital 
creates the danger of insularity, thereby negatively affecting the creation of bonding social capital 
beyond family ties, and the crafting of bridging social capital with outside stakeholders. Family 
businesses achieving longevity are those firms that have been able to overcome BB and have 
engaged in corporate diplomacy efforts to augment bonding social capital (ties with nonfamily 
members), and bridging social capital (ties with outside stakeholders, including those operating in 
the macro-environment).  In addition, corporate diplomacy efforts deployed to improve bonding 
social capital in the realm of ties among successive family generations are critical to the 
intergenerational transmission of governance mechanisms, including especially the family firm’s 
overall reservoir of network ties.  This, we have argued, contributes to explaining the longevity 
paradox of family firms: Long-lived family businesses are those able to complement intrinsic 
governance strengths in the realm of family-based ties, with corporate diplomacy processes that 
augment the firm’s broader bonding and bridging social capital, in support of efficient 
transactions. 
Our contribution is threefold. First, we build upon prior studies (Gedajlovic & Carney, 
2010; Memili et al., 2011; Pollak, 1985; Verbeke & Kano, 2010, 2012) to provide a TCE-based 
explanation of the family firm longevity paradox, with the capacity to predict when firms are 
more likely to sustain family governance over several generations. Prior TCE-based studies dealt 
primarily with the uniqueness of family firm’s governance choices, but did not attempt to explain 
longevity, nor has the concept of BB been linked to longevity. Our augmented TCE-based model 
helps explain not only why some family firms achieve exceptional longevity (a phenomenon 
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discussed in extant literature, e.g., from the stewardship perspective), but also why other family 
firms do not, thus adding an actionable, predictive dimension to the extant discussion of family 
firm longevity. 
Second, we extend prior work on BB by identifying the specific mechanisms through 
which firms achieve BB economizing. Here, we adopt corporate diplomacy as a framework to 
discuss the process-related practices that augment social capital as a governance mechanism, 
thereby supporting efficient transactions and longevity.  Corporate diplomacy thinking is fairly 
underutilized in management studies at present, but we demonstrate how this process-oriented 
approach can be used for studying how social capital is created. 
Third, we include in our analysis the interplay between the firm and its macro-
environment. While TCE acknowledges the interaction between the firm and its environment, it 
typically does not address process-related mechanisms that managers employ to improve and 
augment network ties in response to changes in macro-level shift conditions, in order to support 
efficient transactions.  We extend TCE-based analysis of the family firm by predicting longevity, 
inter alia as a function of the firm’s sustained efforts to augment its bridging social capital and to 
remain aligned with macro-level shift conditions.  
Our study yields actionable implications for family firm leaders. We offer a road map for 
economizing on BB, and augmenting social capital through corporate diplomacy. We provide 
illustrations of economizing practices employed in some of the world’s oldest and most 
successful family firms. We also outline distinct, process-related steps for successful 
management practices and network ties to be transmitted across generations, so as to promote 
functional governance for the long term. 
Limitations 
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Studying high longevity could in principle involve a two-pronged analysis: First, identifying 
instances where negative effects of ill-adapted governance could reasonably have been predicted 
ex ante, and where as a result, governance mechanisms, especially in the form of network ties, 
were altered anticipatively by long-lived firms, so as to avoid these negative effects from 
materializing. Second, analyzing processes of correcting ex post ill-adapted governance, inter alia 
as a response to changes in the macro-environmental context.  Our analysis, though leaving room 
for the latter approach, has focused primarily on the former, i.e., on preventive and anticipative 
governance practices, rather than on corrective ones.  Our analysis could therefore be criticized 
for being limited to linking managerial practices (interpreted as having been well-designed 
anticipatively) with the outcome of longevity, without much focus on when, and how, any (and 
possibly many) governance failures led to ex post governance corrections, particularly changes in 
the fabric of network ties commanded by the firm. 
 It should also be noted that long-lived family firms represent the tail end of a distribution 
– that is, they remain exceptional cases. It is useful to theorize and describe how these firms 
achieve longevity, but there are limits to the extent to which these practices are transferable to the 
average firm. Still, economizing, efficiency-enhancing practices that augment social capital are 
worth noting and implementing. 
Directions for future research 
Future studies can operationalize our model linking economizing mechanisms in the realm of 
governance and longevity. Exploratory research – e.g., historical case analyses – could be 
conducted to compare governance in high-longevity family firms and in firms that failed to 
survive as family businesses, thereby mitigating survivor bias in research. We hope that our 
analysis, which has introduced corporate diplomacy thinking in the context of family firm 
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governance, can contribute to a new research agenda on survival and longevity, involving both 
family business and strategy scholars.  
REFERENCES 
Acquaah, M. (2012). Social networking relationships, firm‐specific managerial experience and 
firm performance in a transition economy: A comparative analysis of family owned and 
nonfamily firms. Strategic Management Journal, 33(10), 1215-1228. 
 
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S. W. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy of 
Management Review, 27(1), 17-40. 
 
Arregle, J. L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., & Very, P. (2007). The development of organizational 
social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1), 73-95. 
 
Banfield, E. C. (1958). The moral basis of a backward society. New York: Free Press. 
 
Barrick, M. R., Thurgood, G. R., Smith, T. A., & Courtright, S. H. (2015). Collective 
organizational engagement: Linking motivational antecedents, strategic implementation, and firm 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 58(1), 111-135. 
 
Basdeo, D. K., Smith, K. G., Grimm, C. M., Rindova, V. P., & Derfus, P. J. (2006). The impact 
of market actions on firm reputation. Strategic Management Journal, 27(12), 1205-1219. 
 
Bennedsen, M., & Foss, N. (2015). Family assets and liabilities in the innovation process. 
California Management Review, 58(1), 65-81. 
 
Bennedsen, M., & Henry, B. (2016). Hénokiens: The Families and Firms Who Made History. 
INSEAD. Retrieved from: 
http://www.henokiens.com/userfiles/file/The_Henokiens_Case_Introduction_&_Conclusion.pdf  
 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010). Socioemotional 
wealth and corporate responses to institutional pressures: Do family-controlled firms pollute less? 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1), 82-113. 
 
Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2006). The role of family in family firms. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 20(2), 73-96. 
 
Blombäck, A., & Craig, J. (2014). Marketing from a family business perspective. In Melin, L., 
Nordqvist, M., & Sharma, P. (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of family business (pp. 423-441). 
London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
 
Burt, R. S. (2004). Structural holes and good ideas. American journal of sociology, 110(2), 349-
399. 
 
 34 
Cadbury, S. A. (2000). Family firms and their governance: Creating tomorrow's company from 
today's. London: Egon Zehnder International. 
 
Campopiano, G., & De Massis, A. (2015). Corporate social responsibility reporting: A content 
analysis in family and non-family firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 129(3), 511-534. 
 
Campopiano, G., De Massis, A., & Chirico, F. (2014). Firm philanthropy in small-and medium-
sized family firms: The effects of family involvement in ownership and management. Family 
Business Review, 27(3), 244-258. 
 
Carr, J. C., Cole, M. S., Ring, J. K., & Blettner, D. P. (2011). A measure of variations in internal 
social capital among family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(6), 1207-1227. 
 
Chandler, A. D., & Salsbury, S. (1971). Pierre S. du Pont and the making of the modern 
corporation. New York: Harper & Row.   
 
Chrisman, J.J. (2018). Stewardship Theory: a critical review of its tenets, boundaries, and 
applications to family firms governance. Mimeo. 
 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Steier, L. P. (2011). Resilience of family firms: An introduction. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(6), 1107-1119. 
 
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., Steier, L. P., & Rau, S. B. (2012). Sources of heterogeneity in family 
firms: An introduction. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36(6), 1103-1113. 
 
Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of 
Sociology, 94, S95-S120. 
 
Corbetta, G., & Salvato, C. (2004). Self‐serving or self‐actualizing? Models of man and agency 
costs in different types of family firms: A commentary on “comparing the agency costs of family 
and non‐family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence”. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 28(4), 355-362. 
 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20-47. 
 
Dyer, W. G. (2006). Examining the “family effect” on firm performance. Family Business 
Review, 19(4), 253-273. 
 
Dyer, W. G., & Whetten, D. A. (2006). Family firms and social responsibility: Preliminary 
evidence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(6), 785-802. 
 
Dupont-Calbo, J. & Amiot, M. (2017). Tavares L'autre Carlos. Retrieved from: 
https://www.lesechos.fr/05/05/2017/LesEchosWeekEnd/00075-008-ECWE_tavares-l-autre-
carlos.htm.  
 
 35 
Fainsilber, D. (2014). Les difficiles relations du patron de PSA avec la famille Peugeot. Retrieved 
from: 
https://www.lesechos.fr/18/02/2014/lesechos.fr/0203324329502_les-difficiles-relations-du-
patron-de-psa-avec-la-famille-peugeot.htm. 
 
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The journal of Law 
and Economics, 26(2), 301-325. 
 
Frescobaldi D., Solinas F., & Tosi P. (2004). I Frescobaldi: Una famiglia fiorentina. Florence: 
Le lettere. 
 
Gao, C., Zuzul, T., Jones, G., & Khanna, T. (2017). Overcoming institutional voids: A 
reputation‐based view of long‐run survival. Strategic Management Journal, 38(11), 2147-2167. 
 
Gargiulo, M., & Benassi, M. (2000). Trapped in your own net? Network cohesion, structural 
holes, and the adaptation of social capital. Organization Science, 11(2), 183-196. 
 
Gedajlovic, E., & Carney, M. (2010). Markets, hierarchies, and families: Toward a transaction 
cost theory of the family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(6), 1145-1172. 
 
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Núñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. 
(2007). Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from 
Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1), 106-137. 
 
Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Larraza Kintana, M. (2010). Diversification decisions in 
family‐controlled firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2), 223-252. 
 
Habbershon, T. G., Williams, M., & MacMillan, I. C. (2003). A unified systems perspective of 
family firm performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(4), 451-465. 
 
Hall, A., Melin, L. & Nordqvist, M. (2001). Entrepreneurship as radical change in the family 
business: Exploring the role of cultural patterns. Family Business Review, 24(3), 193-208. 
 
Henisz, W. (2014). Corporate diplomacy: Building reputations and relationships with external 
stakeholders. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing.  
 
Hennart, J. F. (1994). The ‘comparative institutional’ theory of the firm: some implications for 
corporate strategy. Journal of Management Studies, 31(2), 193-208. 
 
Hennart, J. F., Majocchi, A., & Forlani, E. 2017. The myth of the stay-at-home family firm: How 
family-managed SMEs can overcome their internationalization limitations. Journal of 
International Business Studies, advance online publication August 21. doi:10.1057/s41267-017-
0091-y.  
 
Hernandez, M. (2012). Toward an understanding of the psychology of stewardship. Academy of 
Management Review, 37(2), 172-193. 
 
 36 
Ivarsson, I., & Alvstam, C. G. (2010). Upgrading in global value-chains: A case study of 
technology-learning among IKEA-suppliers in China and Southeast Asia. Journal of Economic 
Geography, 11(4), 731-752. 
 
Jaskiewicz, P., Combs, J. G., & Rau, S. B. (2015). Entrepreneurial legacy: Toward a theory of 
how some family firms nurture transgenerational entrepreneurship. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 30(1), 29-49. 
 
Jennings, J. E., Dempsey, D., & James, A. E. (2018). Bifurcated HR practices in family firms: 
Insights from the normative-adaptive approach to stepfamilies. Human Resource Management 
Review, 28(1), 68-82. 
 
Kahn, W. A. (1990). Psychological conditions of personal engagement and disengagement at 
work. Academy of Management Journal, 33(4), 692-724. 
 
Kang, D.C. (2003). Transactions costs and crony capitalism in East Asia. Comparative Politics, 
35(4), 439–458.  
 
Kano, L. (2018). Global value chain governance: A relational perspective. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 49(6), 684-705.  
 
Kano, L., & Verbeke, A. (2015). The three faces of bounded reliability: Alfred Chandler and the 
micro-foundations of management theory. California Management Review, 58(1), 97-122. 
 
Kano, L., & Verbeke, A. (2018). Family firm internationalization: Heritage assets and the impact 
of bifurcation bias. Global Strategy Journal, 8(1), 158-183. 
 
Le Breton‐Miller, I., & Miller, D. (2006). Why do some family businesses out‐compete? 
Governance, long‐term orientations, and sustainable capability. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 30(6), 731-746. 
 
Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. (2011). Commentary: Family firms and the advantage of 
multitemporality. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(6), 1171-1177. 
 
Lee, K. S., Lim, G. H., & Lim, W. S. (2003). Family business succession: Appropriation risk and 
choice of successor. Academy of Management Review, 28(4), 657-666. 
 
Leleux, B. F., & Glemser, A. (2011). The Mercks of Darmstadt: What family can do. IMD Case 
Studies, IMD 505. 
 
Lubatkin, M. H., Durand, R., & Ling, Y. (2007). The missing lens in family firm governance 
theory: A self-other typology of parental altruism. Journal of Business Research, 60(10), 1022-
1029. 
 
Lumpkin, G. T., & Brigham, K. H. (2011). Long–term orientation and intertemporal choice in 
family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(6), 1149-1169. 
 
 37 
Lumpkin, G. T., Martin, W., & Vaughn, M. (2008). Family orientation: individual‐level 
influences on family firm outcomes. Family Business Review, 21(2): 127-138. 
 
Memili, E., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2011). Transaction costs and outsourcing decisions in 
small-and medium-sized family firms. Family Business Review, 24(1), 47-61. 
 
Micelotta, E., & Raynard, M. (2011). Concealing or revealing the family? Corporate brand 
identity strategies in family firms. Family Business Review, 24(3), 197-216.  
 
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005). Managing for the Long Run: Lessons in Competitive 
Advantage from Great Family Businesses. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
 
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006). Family governance and firm performance: Agency, 
stewardship, and capabilities. Family Business Review, 19(1), 73-87. 
 
Miller, D., Lee, I., Chang, S., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2009). Filling the institutional void: The 
social behavior and performance of family vs non-family technology firms in emerging markets. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 40, 802-818. 
 
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational 
advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2), 242-266. 
 
Ordeix-Rigo, E., & Duarte, J. (2009). From public diplomacy to corporate diplomacy: Increasing 
corporation’s legitimacy and influence. American Behavioral Scientist, 53(4), 549-564.  
 
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(3), 137-158. 
 
Parmentier, M. A. (2011). When David met Victoria: Forging a strong family brand. Family 
Business Review, 24(3), 217-232. 
 
Pearson, A. W., Carr, J. C., & Shaw, J. C. (2008). Toward a theory of familiness: A social capital 
perspective. Entrepreneurship theory and practice, 32(6), 949-969. 
 
Pongelli, C., Calabrò, A., & Basco, R. (2018). Family firms' international make-or-buy decisions: 
Captive offshoring, offshore outsourcing, and the role of home region focus. Journal of Business 
Research. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.02.033.  
 
Pollak, R. A. (1985). A transaction cost approach to families and households. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 23(2), 581-608. 
 
Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review 
of Sociology, 24, 1–24.  
 
Putnam, R.D. (2000) Bowling alone. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
 38 
Ramos, H. M., Man, T. W. Y., Mustafa, M., & Ng, Z. Z. (2014). Psychological ownership in 
small family firms: Family and non-family employees’ work attitudes and behaviours. Journal of 
Family Business Strategy, 5(3), 300-311. 
 
Reuber, A. R. (2016). An assemblage‐theoretic perspective on the internationalization processes 
of family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 40(6), 1269-1286. 
 
Rindova, V. P., Williamson, I. O., Petkova, A. P., & Sever, J. M. (2005). Being good or being 
known: An empirical examination of the dimensions, antecedents, and consequences of 
organizational reputation. Academy of Management Journal, 48(6), 1033-1049. 
 
Salvato, C., & Melin, L. (2008). Creating value across generations in family-controlled 
businesses: The role of family social capital. Family Business Review, 21(3), 259-276. 
 
Saner, R., Yiu, L., & Søndergaard, M. (2000). Business diplomacy management: A core 
competency for global companies. Academy of Management Perspectives, 14(1), 80-92. 
 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). Agency relationships 
in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization science, 12(2), 99-116. 
 
Seigal, J. (2007). Contingent political capital and international alliances: Evidence from South 
Korea. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52, 621–666.  
Sharma, P. (2008). Commentary: Familiness: Capital stocks and flows between family and 
business. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(6), 971-977. 
 
Sharma, P., & Manikutty, S. (2005). Strategic divestments in family firms: Role of family 
structure and community culture. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(3), 293-311. 
 
Sirmon, D. G., & Hitt, M. A. (2003). Managing resources: Linking unique resources, 
management, and wealth creation in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 
339-358. 
 
Stadler, C., Mayer, M. C., Hautz, J., & Matzler, K. (2018). International and product 
diversification: Which strategy suits family managers? Global Strategy Journal, 8(1), 184-207. 
 
Stamm, I., & Lubinski, C. (2011). Crossroads of family business research and firm 
demography—A critical assessment of family business survival rates. Journal of Family Business 
Strategy, 2(3), 117-127. 
 
Steger, U. (2003). Corporate diplomacy: The strategy for a volatile, fragmented business 
environment. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Tagliabue, J. (2003). Giovanni Agnelli, Fiat patriarch and a force in Italy dies at 81. The New 
York Times-Online. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/25/business/giovanni-
agnelli-fiat-patriarch-and-a-force-in-italy-dies-at-81.html. 
 
 39 
Tàpies, J., & Fernández Moya, M. (2012). Values and longevity in family business: Evidence 
from a cross-cultural analysis. Journal of Family Business Management, 2(2), 130-146. 
 
Uhlaner, L. M., van Goor-Balk, H. J. M., & Masurel, E. (2004). Family business and corporate 
social responsibility in a sample of Dutch firms. Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, 11(2), 186-194. 
 
Verbeke, A., & Greidanus, N. S. (2009). The end of the opportunism vs trust debate: Bounded 
reliability as a new envelope concept in research on MNE governance. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 40(9), 1471-1495. 
 
Verbeke, A., & Kano, L. (2010). Transaction cost economics (TCE) and the family firm. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(6), 1173-1182. 
 
Verbeke, A., & Kano, L. (2012). The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: 
Family–based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias. Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, 36(6), 1183-1205. 
 
Volpato, G. (2008). Fiat Group Automobiles: Le nuove sfide. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
 
Ward, J. L. (2004). Perpetuating the family business: 50 lessons learned from long-lasting 
success. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Westermann-Behaylo, M. K., Rehbein, K., & Fort, T. (2015). Enhancing the concept of corporate 
diplomacy: Encompassing political corporate social responsibility, international relations, and 
peace through commerce. Academy of Management Perspectives, 29(4), 387-404. 
 
Westwood, R. (1997). Harmony and patriarchy: The cultural basis for 'paternalistic headship' 
among the overseas Chinese. Organization Studies, 18(3), 445-480. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The modern corporation: origins, evolution, attributes. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 19(4), 1537-1568. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wislocki, A. (2017). Gorgona: the wine made by prisoners. Decanter Online. Retrieved from: 
http://www.decanter.com/features/gorgona-tuscanys-island-white-365678/. 
 
WorldAtlas. (2018). The oldest companies still operating today. Retrieved from 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-oldest-companies-still-operating-today.html.  
 
Zavyalova, A., Pfarrer, M. D., Reger, R. K., & Shapiro, D. L. (2012). Managing the message: 
The effects of firm actions and industry spillovers on media coverage following wrongdoing. 
Academy of Management Journal, 55(5), 1079-1101. 
 40 
Table 1. The corporate diplomacy tripod in family firms:  Objectives and mechanisms  
 Step 1: Reciprocal familiarization Step 2: Mutual acceptance Step 3: Mutual engagement 
Macro Objectives: 
 Enhancing familiarity with features and 
capabilities of a broad range of 
stakeholders 
 Educating external stakeholders on the 
firm 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Scanning of macro-level 
changes/contextual awareness 
 Considering a broad set of stakeholders 
as relevant to decision-making (incl. non-
family/non-kin-controlled)  
 Evaluating continued relevance of 
existing stakeholders 
 Communicating relevant information 
(value proposition/family identity) 
through public channels 
Objectives: 
 Recognizing a fundamental 
similarity in value systems of 
the family firm and external 
stakeholders 
 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Developing the firm’s reputation 
for honest business dealings 
 Broad-based relationship 
building 
 Strengthening functional links 
with relevant/new stakeholders 
(potentially without a family 
connection) during periods of 
macro-level shifts 
Objectives: 
 Establishing the firm as an attractive 
business partner and valuable 
community member in relevant 
markets 
 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Solidifying partnerships with a variety 
of relevant business actors through 
asset-specific investments 
 Investing in multiple communities 
where the firm operates 
 Creating shared values and symbols 
 Direct involvement of family/senior 
family firm leaders with relevant 
actors (regulators/policy 
makers/thought leaders) 
Firm Objectives: 
 Improving familiarity with non-family 
managers’ conduct and expertise 
 Transferring idiosyncratic knowledge 
about the firm to non-family managers 
 
 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Formal commitment to information 
exchange/access 
 Sharing family documentation/archives 
 Informal socialization (joint events) 
Objectives: 
 Enhancing the similarity in 
value systems among the family, 
the firm, and non-family 
employees 
 Enacting these shared values 
through the firm’s strategy 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Explicit recognition of expertise 
and value of non-family 
managers 
 Attaching full legitimacy to 
decisions delegated to non-
family managers 
 Non-family managers accept 
core values of the family as 
underlying principles of 
governance 
Objectives: 
 Family firm co-opts non-family 
employees  
 Employees endorse the firm as an 
attractive employer 
 
 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Informal cultivation of mutual 
commitment 
 Multi-level communication lines to 
solicit and implement feedback and 
ideas 
 Meritocracy 
 Formal sharing of awards and 
liabilities among family and non-
family employees 
TG Objectives: 
 Familiarizing present generation of 
family leaders/stakeholders with 
conduct/expertise/worldview of 
upcoming generations 
 Transferring idiosyncratic knowledge 
about the firm to the next generation(s) 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Formal documents outlining the firm’s 
values, organization, governance 
principles 
 Family meetings/events 
 Family intranet 
 Family-specific publications 
 Artefacts  
 Cohabitation/co-location 
Objectives: 
 New generation recognizes the 
firm’s values system  
 Current generation recognizes 
the upcoming generation’s 
potential unique contribution  
 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Informal socializing through 
joint events 
 Mentorship programs 
 Formal ‘sign off’ on values and 
governance principles 
 Building flexibility into guiding 
principles to accommodate 
future generations 
 
Objectives: 
 Upcoming generations become 
involved/contribute to the firm 
 Current generation commits to 
developing and growing the upcoming 
generation(s) 
 
 
Mechanisms: 
 Internship programs 
 Formally exchanging ideas/soliciting 
ideas from younger generation 
 Organizing cross-generational 
technical forums 
 Establishing formal career plans for 
family members entering the firm 
 Cross-generational collaboration on 
strategic projects 
 
